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INTRODUCTION
On April 17, 1995, the President signed into law the District of Co-
lumbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act
("DCFRA").' The DCFRA created the District of Columbia Financial
Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority ("Authority"),
informally referred to as the "Control Board, 2 and modeled in part
after similar entities established in other cities.3
The financial and management crises precipitating the Authority's
creation are known even to the most casual observers of the District.4
1. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995) [hereinafter DCFRA].
2. Although the Authority is almost universally referred to as the "Control Board" or
"Financial Control Board," these terms do not appear in the Act or its amendments.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 24-36 (1995) (contrasting Authority with control boards in
Chicago, Cleveland, Yonkers (N.Y.), Philadelphia, and New York City).
4. Many Americans outside of the District of Columbia are aware of the problems facing
the Nation's capital. See id. at 4 (citing national awareness of D.C.'s financial and management
problems).
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Indeed, some of the more recent city services failures have garnered
national attention.5 With the prospects of insolvency and a shutdown
of government services looming, Congress exercised its plenary legis-
lative authority over the District6 and created the Authority, with the
expectation that its unelected members would rein in District spend-
ing and implement significant management reforms.
Since its creation, the Authority has faced stiff opposition from
Home Rule activists and statehood proponents.8 Public meetings of
the Authority and its appointees are popular settings for protests,
demonstrations and other forms of civil disobedience. 9 The Author-
ity has even encountered opposition from members of Congress who
participated in the drafting of the DCFRAY For many District resi-
dents, the DCFRA and its subsequent amendments represent unac-
ceptable erosions of their "Home Rule" rights under the District of
Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act
("Home Rule Act")." Some suggest the DCFRA was enacted as part
of an elaborate, racist plot by Congress to reverse the demographic
composition of the District of Columbia.12  District of Columbia
5. See Glen Elsasser, Capital City, Capital Crisis, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1996, at 1 (describing
pothole-scarred streets, litter-strewn courthouses, and public schools without lights or function-
ing bathrooms); Tony Kornheiser, Editorial, Watch out for that pothole, it's... carnivorous!,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 2, 1996, at 64A (lamenting number of potholes in District of Co-
lumbia, including one that a Washington resident filled with a mattress); Thomas W. Waldron,
District of Columbia Keeps Cutting As It Nears Running Out of Money, BALT. SUN, June 16, 1995, at
13A (reporting early summer for 80,000 students of D.C. public schools when school system
ran out of money).
6. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 396-97 (1973) (determining Congress'
power over District of Columbia as including that of state legislature or municipal govern-
ment); see also infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' ability to legislate
for District of Columbia).
7. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent for Author-
ity).
8. See Hamil R. Harris, Home Rule Activists Disrupt Control Board Meeting, WASH. POST, Aug.
6, 1997, at A6 (detailing disruption of public meeting announcing implementation of D.C. Re-
vitalization Act); Debbi Wilogoren & Sari Horwitz, Parents Decry Class Inaction; Play, Protest Mark
Day D.C. Schools Were to Open, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1997, at B1 (describing protest outside
school superintendent General Julius W. Becton's office on day public schools were scheduled
to open but did not); Vernon Loeb, Protesters Try to 'Teach' Control Board a Lesson; About 200
Turn Out for Rally Against Social Spending Cuts, WASH. POST, May 16, 1997, at D3 (reporting
. teach in" at Authority's offices aimed at"educating" Authority regarding importance of social
programs).
9. See id. (describing protests and demonstrations endured by Authority and its agents).
10. See Debbi Wilgoren & David Vise, School Board Vows to Fight on Trustees Plan, WASH.
POST, Feb. 13, 1998 at B4. (citing the District's non-voting delegate to the house of Representa-
tives, Eleanor Holmes Norton, criticizing Authority's actions in D.C.'s public schools).
11. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-201 to 1-299.7
(1981)) [hereinafter Home Rule Act).
12. Some of the more radical Home Rule/D.C. statehood proponents and conspiracy
theorists refer to "The Plan," an alleged long-term effort by white members of Congress to re-
turn Washington to a white-majority city. See Marc Fisher, A Big White Lie? To Conspiracy Theo-
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Mayor Marion Barry refers to the 1997 Congressional expansion of
the Authority's power's as "the rape of democracy,"'4 while others
have referred to the five Authority board members as "Mussolinis."''
Despite the protestations and rhetoric from local activists and im-
puissant politicians, Congress continues to strengthen the Authority
and expand its responsibilities, with the expectation that it take a
proactive approach to management reform. 6 This Comment exam-
ines the various laws affecting the responsibilities and powers of the
Authority with respect to its mandate to improve the management ef-
ficiency of the District. Specifically, this Comment analyzes the man-
agement reform and restructuring powers of the Authority under the
original DCFRA, 17 under the so-called "Superpowers" amendment to
the DCFRA, 8 and under the National Capital Revitalization and Self-
Government Improvement Act of 1997 ("D.C. Revitalization Act")."'
Part I provides a brief historical outline of the different governing
bodies that have existed in the District of Columbia. Part II presents
fists, a Takeover of Washington Is Part of "The Plan," WASH. POST, July 31, 1997, at BI (detailing
history of "The Plan" and quoting believers who point to DCFRA as evidence of its existence);
Clarence Page, Democracy on Probation in D.C., BALT. SUN, Aug. 21, 1997, at 21A (referring to
"The Plan" and citing Mayor Marion Barry's references to members of Congress involved in
drafting the DCFRA as "enemies of the people"). Racism may have played at least a part in the
withdrawal of Home Rule from the District of Columbia in 1874. See infra note 30 (discussing
controversy over the allegedly pretextual excuse for the 1874 withdrawal of Home Rule). "The
Plan" has been cited as the underlying purpose of the DCFRA. See id.
13. See infra Part IV (discussing D.C. Revitalization Act).
14. See Vernon Loeb, Brimmer Makes Clear Who's Boss; Mayor Loses Power But Gains an Issue,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1997, at C1 (quoting Mayor Barry using phrase at weekly press briefing);
Cynthia Tucker, Bad Government; Black Voters Lose Tolerance for D.C. Mayor, ATLANTA CONST.,
Sept. 14, 1997, at 7F (referring to Mayor Barry as "the poster boy for poor government" and
citing his repeated use of phrase); Washington's 'Mayorfor Life' Has Little to Do; Congress' Overhaul
Leaves Some Upset, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1997, at 8 (citing Barry's use of phrase while describing
Republican members of Congress);John Kolbe, Civic Rule Hits Bottom in Capita4 Congress Quietly
Rides to the Rescue, ARIz. REPUB., Aug. 22, 1997, at B7 (also quotingJesse Jackson's reference to
Authority as "a military junta").
15. Steve Twomey, The Price of D.C. 's Salvation, WASH. POST, July 31, 1997, at DI; Susanna
Spencer, Letter to the Editor, Home Rule Trashed, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1997, at A22 (agreeing
with Twomey's "Mussolini analogy" when speaking of transfer of power from D.C.'s elected of-
ficials to Authority).
16. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (citing legislative history relating to intended
scope of management reform in District).
17. See infra Part III (examining DCFRA).
18. DCFRA, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995), as amended by Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 5203(f), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009,
3009-3503. The amendment was first referred to as the "super power" by the plaintiffs' attorney
in Shook v. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, 964 F.
Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1997), affd in part and rev'd in part, 132 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1998), at a TRO
hearing. See Transcript of Temporary Restraining Order at 20-21, Shook v. District of Colum-
bia Fin. Responsibility and Management Assistance Auth., 964 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1997) (No.
96-2601) (statement of Ms. Barbara S. Wahl).
19. National Capital Revitalization and Self Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 [hereinafter D.C. Revitalization Act]; see also infra Part A'
(discussing D.C. Revitalization Act).
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an overview of the more significant financial and management fail-
ures leading to the passage of the DCFRA. Part III examines the
original DCFRA and the Authority's interpretation of its manage-
ment reform responsibilities and powers as manifested by its recom-
mendations issued to departments and agencies of the District gov-
ernment.
Part III also examines the "Superpowers" amendment to the
DCFRA, and Authority interpretation of this amendment. Part IV
analyzes the Authority's transformation from a "financial control
board" to Washington's Chief Executive Officer under the D.C. Revi-
talization Act.
Finally, recommendations are made to the various entities that
continue to influence and set policy for the District of Columbia:
The Authority, Congress, and the President of the United States. Al-
though much could be written concerning the denial of democratic
privileges to the citizens of Washington, the recommendations of-
fered in this Comment focus solely on guaranteeing the Authority's
success at ending the crisis currently gripping the Nation's Capital.
Once its goal is accomplished, District residents will be in a position
to make a credible appeal to Congress for a renewal of Home Rule.
I. HIsTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of municipal government in the District of Columbia is
long and colorful. Congress' experiments in local governance" have
included attempts at six different municipal structures, expanding
and contracting with each the degree of local autonomy.21
A. Express Language of the Constitution
Control over the District of Columbia is expressly granted to Con-
gress by the Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the
power "to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
20. As early as 1874, Congress referred to the variety of municipal governments tried in
the District of Columbia as "experiments." See H.R. REP. No. 44-64, at 1 (1876); S. REP. No. 43-
479, at 1 (1874).
21. The six forms of government can be described generally as: (1) Mayor-City Council
(1801-1812); (2) Board of Aldermen and Board of Common Council (1812-1871); (3) Territo-
rial Governor (1871-1874); (4) Board of (Three) Commissioners (1874-1967); (5) Single
Commissioner (1967-1973); and (6) Mayor-City Council (1973-current). SeeJason I. Newman
& Jacques B. DePuy, Bringing Democracy to the Nation's Last Colony: The District of Columbia Self-
Government Act, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 537, 541-47 (1975) (providing summary of various forms of
municipal governments in District of Columbia). Newman and DePuy note a trend in Con-
gress' experiments in that with each new form of government, the degree of self-government
enjoyed by District residents generally increased until 1871, when Congress imposed a
"territorial" government. See id. at 544-45.
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such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat
of the Government of the United States. "22 This exclusive legislative
authority has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as giving Con-
gress plenary power over the District, allowing it to legislate for the
City in a way that would "exceed its powers... or be very unusual if
applied to the nation as a whole. "23 As described below, Congress has
utilized this plenary authority on a number of occasions to alter the
governmental structure of the District of Columbia.
B. 1802-1874
The District of Columbia was incorporated under federal law by
the Act of May 3, 1802.24 A City Charter was established that allowed
for a presidentially-appointed Mayor and popularly electede City
Council. 21 Over the next sixty-nine years, Congress modified the City
Charter several times, in most cases expanding Washington voters'




The Act of June 20, 1874,28 created a temporary, three-
commissioner form of government. This structure was formalized
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
23. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 398 (1973) (citing Capital Traction v. Hof, 174
U.S. 1, 5 (1899)). Both federal Article III courts and the Article I courts of the District of Co-
lumbia have consistently reaffirmed this view of Congress' relationship to the District of Co-
lumbia. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 334-35 (1973) (holding that Congress' deci-
sion to compile and publish report on state of education in D.C. while acting as legislature for
District falls under its plenary authority and is not subject to judicial review); District of Colum-
bia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 429 (1973) (confirming that Congress' legislative powers over the
District of Columbia include all those possessed by a state legislature); Shook v. District of Co-
lumbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Assistance Auth., 964 F. Supp. 416, 421 (D.D.C.
1997) ("The Congress of the United States... has the entire control over the District of Co-
lumbia for every purpose of government-national or local." (quoting Capital Traction, 174 U.S.
at 5)); Darby v. United States, 681 A.2d 1156, 1158 (D.C. 1996) (rejecting argument that Guar-
antee Clause of Constitution applies to, or in any way restricts power of Congress to legislate for
District of Columbia).
24. Act of May 3, 1802, § 2, 2 Stat. 195, ch. 53,reprinted in Acts Relating to the Establishment of
theDistrict of Columbia and Its Various Forms of Governmental Organization, 1 D.C. CODEANN. 17, 49
(1981) [hereinafter Acts Relating to the District of Columbia].
25. Eligible voters under the Act of May 3, 1802, were "free white male inhabitants of full
age, who have resided twelve months in the city, and paid taxes therein the year preceding the
election's being held." Id. at 50.
26. See id. (establishing twelve-member City Council consisting of two chambers: seven
members in the first chamber, and five members in the second).
27. See supra note 21 (listing six forms of government attempted in District of Columbia).
28. Act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. 116, ch. 337, reprinted in Acts Relating to the District of Co-
lumbia, supra note 24, at 99.
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four years later by the Act of June 11, 1878,2 signaling the official
end of Congress' first experiment with self-government in the District
of Columbia." The presidentially-appointed Board of Commission-
ers took over most city governance functions,3 ' and the popularly-
elected, non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives was
withdrawn.32 As the Supreme Court stated in Metropolitan RI. v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, "[1] egislative powers have now ceased, and the mu-
nicipal government is confined to mere administration.3 4
D. 1967-1973
In 1967, President Johnson issued a Reorganization Order replac-
ing the District's three-commissioner system with a single Commis-
sioner-Council form of government." This new system did not con-
fer additional local autonomy on District residents; the Mayor-
Commissioner and nine members of the City Council were ap-
29. Act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 103, ch. 180, reprinted in Acts Relating to the District of Co-
lumbia, supra note 24, at 105.
30. See id. The end of Home Rule and suffrage for D.C. residents did not go without a
fight from the minority members of Congress:
It is the conclusion of the minority that the people of the District of Columbia have a
clear, incontrovertible right to a local government derived from their own suffrages;
that no inhibition against the exercise of such a right is contained in the Constitu-
tion... ; but on the contrary, that Congress is itself inhibited by its constitutional re-
strictions and public obligations from denying or abridging that right ....
The minority, therefore, respectfully recommend that a simple municipal govern-
ment, in the usual form common to American communities, be adopted for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
S. REP. No. 44-572, at 28 (1877), quoted in Newman & DePuy, supra note 21, at 546 n.60.
The official justification for the withdrawal of Home Rule is remarkably similar to the rea-
sons for the contemporary withdrawal: municipal insolvency. See Newman & DePuy, supra note
21, at 546 n.59. At this time, large municipalities across the country were flirting with bank-
ruptcy, some even being taken over by their state sponsors. See 119 CONG. REc. 22,948-49
(1973) (statement of Sen. Mathias) (describing widespread municipal insolvency and corrup-
tion throughout 1870s).
Others have advanced a well-supported argument claiming that conservatives in the District
and in Congress, upset about the "curse of black suffrage," viewed a Congressional takeover of
the District as the only means of preserving white rule. See Newman & DePuy, supra note 21, at
546 n.59 (providing official explanation of disenfranchisement as response to "overspending
and corruption of Shepherd Administration" (quoting Henderson, Why Home Rule Was Taken
From D.C., WASH. STAR-NEwS, Nov. 11, 1973, at G2)).
31. See Act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 103, ch. 180, reprinted in Acts Relating to the District of
Columbia, supra note 24, at 105 (appointing three permanent commissioners with all the powers
and responsibilities of previous government).
32. SeeAct of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. 116, ch. 337, reprinted in Acts Relating to the District of
Columbia, supra note 24, at 99 (repealing law providing for delegate in Congress, executive, sec-
retary, legislative assembly, and board of public works for District of Columbia).
33. 132 U.S. 1 (1899).
34. Id. at 7.
35. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,669 (1967),reprinted in Acts Re-
lating to the Establishment of theDistrict of Columbia, supra note 24, at 126.
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pointed by the President.
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II. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOME RULE ACT AND SUBSEQUENT
FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT CRISES
The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Re-
organization Act ("Home Rule Act") 7 produced thousands of pages
of legislative history as Congress debated the soundness of restoring
some form of self-government to the District,3 and what form such a
municipal government should take.39 Eventually, Congress settled on
a Strong-Mayor 0 system with an elected City Council For the first
time in nearly a century, residents of the District of Columbia pos-
sessed a degree of local autonomy.
Financial problems are not new to the District of Columbia. As
mentioned above, they were at least a pretext for the original Con-
gressional repeal of Home Rule in 1878.42 Over the past twenty years,
however, financial and managerial problems again reached crisis
proportions, threatening the City's ability to provide basic city serv-
ices. Discussed below are some of the more egregious examples of
the problems which led to the Authority's creation.
36. See id. § 201. The new Mayor-Commissioner received all of the power and authority of
the former three commissioners, with the exception of some "quasi-legislative" functions which
were reserved for the City Council. See id. § 401; see also Newman & DePuy, supra note 21, at
547 (describing "quasi-legislative" powers given to City Council).
37. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended atD.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-
201 to 1-299.7 (1981)).
38. Some members of Congress opposed the delegation of congressional authority to a
municipal government in Washington. See Newman & DePuy, supra note 21, at 569-73
(discussing constitutional concerns over Home Rule Act expressed by members of Congress).
39. See Markup by Full Committee of H.R. 9056, Titles Il and IV, (1973), reprinted in Background
and Legislative History of H.R. 9056, H.R. 9682, and Related Bills, 93D CONG., at 1049 (1974)
(statement of Rep. Adams) (describing decision to provide for strong mayor rather than City
Manager system). See generally Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government of the
District of Columbia, H.R. Doc. No. 92-317, vol. 1, at 141 [hereinafter Nelson Commission Report]
(calling for greater executive and legislative autonomy in District immediately prior to Home
Rule Act); Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, supra note 35, at 160-61 (citing problems inher-
ent with divided executive authority and benefits of single executive system).
40. A "Strong-Mayor" system allows the Mayor veto power over legislation passed by the
Council, the ability to reorganize any executive agency or department (which includes most
D.C. government agencies), and the ability to appoint the heads of each of these agencies or
departments, subject to Council approval. See Home Rule Act, § 422, 87 Stat. at 798-99. Ex-
cepted from Mayoral (and Council) control are "independent agencies," identified in sections
491-495 of the Home Rule Act. See id. §§ 491-495 (identifying Board of Elections and Ethics,
Zoning Commission, Public Service Commission, Armory Board, and Board of Education as
independent agencies). The nature of these independent agencies became a key topic in the
lawsuit challenging the Authority's action regarding the Board of Education, discussed infra
Part C.l.
41. See Home Rule Act § 401 (a), (b) (1) (providing for thirteen-member, popularly elected
"Council of the District of Columbia"); see also supra note 39 (discussing Congress' decision to
establish Strong-Mayor system).
42. See supra note 30 (discussing municipal insolvency as reason for repeal of home rule).
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A. District Agencies in Receivership
Recognizing the crises in individual departments and agencies of
government, courts have carved out chunks of the District govern-
ment and removed them from local control. In at least one case, a
special master assumed control of specific agency functions,43 and in
another case, the entire agency was placed in receivership.4 These
actions were generally taken after repeated failures to comply with
court-mandated reforms, or when it became clear that the depart-
ment or agency was not capable or could no longer be trusted to im-
plement the necessary reforms.
For example, recognizing the abysmal condition of the Depart-
ment of Public and Assisted Housing, D.C. Superior Court Judge
Steffen W. Graae placed the Department in receivership and under
the direction of the federal Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment ("HUD") in May, 1995.' 6 In the Department of Correc-
tions, a federal judge appointed a special investigator to handle all
sexual harassment claims within the agency and a receiver over
medical care. 7 Finally, the Child Welfare Agency, part of the De-
partment of Human Services, was placed in full receivership when
the City failed to meet several judicially imposed deadlines and re-
43. See infra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing appointment of Special Master in
Department of Corrections).
44. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (identifying order of D.C. Superior Court
judge that placed Department of Public and Assisted Housing in receivership).
45. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (describing placement of Child Welfare Serv-
ice in receivership after repeated failures to comply with court orders); see also H.R. REP. No.
104-96, at 8-9 (1995) (describing budgetary problems associated with District's failure to antici-
pate costs of abiding by consent decrees or court-ordered corrections).
46, SeeVernon Loeb, D.C. Cedes Control of Housing Agency; Takeover by Receiver to Last at Least
3 Years, WASH. POST, May 5, 1995, at Al (describing court-ordered takeover and appointment
of housing receiver); see also Vernon Loeb, A Miserable Place to Call Home; SE Complex Illustrates
Daunting Task FacingD.C. Housing Receiver, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1995, at Al (describing dilapi-
dated public housing projects).
47. The Department of Corrections is currently operating under seven major court orders
and consent decrees, each the result of a lawsuit alleging unlawful conditions of confinement,
sexual harassment, or poor medical care. See Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. District
of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C.
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997) (providing exhaustive analysis of abuses in De-
partment of Corrections); see also OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, "A Re-
view of Court Orders and Consent Decrees," FY 1998 District of Columbia Budget and Financial
Plan, Mar. 18, 1997, at G-2 to G-7 (providing summary of all court orders and consent decrees
entered against departments and agencies of District of Columbia and estimated cost of com-
pliance for FY1998-FY2001); Katya Lezin, Life at Lorton: An Examination of Prisoners' Rights at the
District of Columbia Correctional Facilities, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 165, 190-95 (1996) (describing de-
plorable state of medical facilities at D.C. correctional facilities); Toni Locy, City Settles Suit On
Harassment For $8 Million; Deal Adds Inspector To Corrections Department, WASH. POST, Aug. 29,
1997, at Al (citing judge's praise of settlement agreement in sexual harassment case against
Department of Corrections).
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peatedly failed to abide by numerous court orders."
Thus, prior to the enactment of the DCFRA in 1995, large chunks
of the D.C. government were being surgically removed from local
control. Home Rule was dying a slow death on its own and there was
no evidence of significant reforms, coming either from the Mayor's
office or the Council, that would stop the hemorrhage. 9
B. Financial Mismanagement and Budget Deficits
In fiscal year 1994, the District recorded a $335 million deficit'o
and continued a trend of depending solely on the annual federal
payment' to pay bills incurred from the previous year.52 Thirty-nine
percent of the federal payment for 1991, for example, was used to
pay bills from 1990, even after receiving $331 million from a bond
issue intended to remedy the operating deficit." In addition, the Dis-
trict consistently over-estimated revenue income in the early 90s: in-
come tax revenues in 1991 and 1992 were about $100 million under
the original estimates,54 and sales tax revenues annually averaged over
$34 million below estimates for the years 1991, 1992, and 1993.55
The Mayor was also unsuccessful in curbing overspending by Dis-
trict agencies under his control.56 Officials in government agencies
reportedly failed to enter bills into the City's "financial management
48. See LaShawn v. Barry, Civ. No. 89-1754, 1995 WL 520763 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1995)
(General Receivership Order) (outlining details of receivership); see also LaShawn v. Dixon,
762 F. Supp. 959, 986 (D.D.C. 1991) (providing exhaustive recitation of abuses, incompetence,
and neglect at Child and Family Services Division), affd, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 10-15 (1995) (describing failure of District government to
take steps necessary to improve conditions in many areas of D.C. government); see also
LaShaum, 762 F. Supp. at 986-88 (D.D.C. 1991) (describing District's intransigence in response
to court-ordered reforms of Child Welfare service).
50. See H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 7; see also id. at 10-15 (describing District's failure to ad-
dress overspending, cut personnel, adopt a long-term financial plan, or provide requested in-
formation to Congress on Washington's financial status).
51. A federal payment was made annually to the District of Columbia as compensation for
many of the services provided by the City that would normally be handled by a state govern-
ment. The payment also compensated the District for services provided to the tax-exempt fed-
eral agencies located in the District. See Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 501(b), 87 Stat.
774, 812 (1973) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-201 to 1-299.7 (1981)). The
D.C. Revitalization Act abolished the annual federal payment in exchange for assumption by
the federal government of large District liabilities. See infra Part IV (discussing D.C. Revitaliza-
tion Act).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 7-8 (describing District's increasing reliance on federal
payments).
53. See id. at 8. Even more disturbing, outstanding obligations for Fiscal Year 1995 were
$126 million norethan the entire federal payment. Seeid.
54. See id. (documenting District's failed attempts at forecasting revenues).
55. See id. Compounding the problem, the District underestimated expenditures for the
Department of Human Services, the District's largest department of government, by $64 mil-
lion in fiscal year 1992 and $84 million in fiscal year 1993. See id.
56. See id. (documenting local officials' failure to address specific causes of financial crisis).
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system" in an effort to make their agencies' financial situation appear
better. 7 The result was confusion over how much was actually owed
to vendors and contractors, and uncertainty about the actual dollar
amounts that would be required of the City to satisfy those debts.8
C. Public Works
The District's repeated failures in the area of public works have re-
ceived the most national attention. During what has been called the
"Blizzard of '96," a city-wide failure to plow snow from Washington's
streets left many D.C. citizens stranded in their homes.59 Reports of
potholes filled with mattresses" and on-the-clock city employees do-
ing work at a private residence in Virginia received nationwide atten-
tion,6' placing additional pressure to intervene on Congresspersons
from constituents who were concerned and/or embarrassed by the
deteriorating conditions in the nation's capital.
D. Public Safety
The Metropolitan Police Department has been equally plagued
with allegations of ineffectiveness and corruption.2 With more than
400 murders annually, Washington, D.C. had the highest per capita
homicide rate in the nation from the late 1980's to 1994.63 In addi-
tion, crime has decreased nationally since 1991, by eleven percent
per person, while during the same period in the District, crime in-
creased sixteen percent per person.'
57. See Howard Schneider & David A. Vise, D.C. Failing to Rein in Spending Report Says,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1995, at Al (portraying lack of leadership and accountability in District
departments and agencies).
58. See id. (describing D.C.'s dwindling cash supply and its inevitable need to borrow from
U.S. Treasury); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 11-13 (decrying D.C. Mayor Barry's repeated
requests for additional federal aid).
59. See Vernon Loeb, At Snow Emergency Drill, Barry Says the City is Ready, WASH. POST, Dec.
8, 1996, at B9 (describing lessons learned from previous year's "blizzard" and District's attempts
to remedy problem); see also All Year, One Problem After Another; Snow Fel4" City Agencies Faltered,
The Budget Crisis Went On and On, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1996, at Jl (reminiscing over year of
debacles in District government, including problems associated with winter of 1996 snow
storms).
60. See supra note 5 (citing several media reports of public works failures).
61. See Cheryl W. Thompson, On the Clock in D.C., On the Job in Virginia; District Official Used
Workers at Her Home WASH. POST, June 4, 1997, at BI (reporting on city workers performing
services for Department of Corrections administrator while on the clock for the city).
62. See Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, The District
of Columbia Steering Committee: Review and Analysis of the Metropolitan Police Department, Feb. 22,
1995 (on file with The American University Law Review) [hereinafter Holder Report] (describing
MPD deficiencies in personnel, management, technology and equipment).
63. See id. at 2. In addition to the high murder rate, the violent crime rate in Washington
in 1993 was exceeded only by Atlanta, Miami, St. Louis, and Baltimore. Seeid.
64. See BOoz-ALLEN & HAMILTON INC., BASELINE REPORT: CRIME FIGHTING EFFORTS IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, III-1 (1997) (prepared for District of Columbia Financial Responsibility
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On February 26, 1997, the Authority issued the Resolution, Order
and Recommendation Concerning the Metropolitan Police Department
("MPD Resolution") as the first step toward reforming the Metropoli-
tan Police Department.5 The findings accompanying the MPD Reso-
lution expose significant management weaknesses in the depart-
ment. The study identified the absence of a consistent law-
enforcement strategy, poor internal organization, and a police chief
who was not "empowered to take the necessary steps for both imme-
diate and long-run reduction of crime and the fear of crime," as sig-
nificant factors contributing to poor performance.
E. District of Columbia Public Schools
Cited by many former D.C. citizens as the primary reason for leav-
ing the District,6 Washington's troubled public schools have been
plagued with hundreds of fire code violations, school closures, and
poor educational opportunities. 9 A recent comprehensive study of
the D.C. Public Schools, undertaken by the Authority, found that al-
though the District spends more per student than any other school
district in the country, save Newark, New Jersey, students' perform-
ance on standardized tests is well below the national average."
and Management Assistance Authority). Increases in individual crime statistics for the District
of Columbia from 1985-1996 are even more striking: Homicide-169%; Robbery-50%; Assault-
39%; Burglary-13%; Theft-33%; Motor Vehicle Theft-98%. Seeid.
65. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority,
Resolution, Order and Recommendations Concerning the Metropolitan Police Department, Feb. 26, 1997
[hereinafter MPD Resolution].
66. The Authority's findings were based on a report generated by the consulting firm of
Booz-Allen & Hamilton. See supra note 64. The Authority contracted with Booz-Allen to per-
form a thorough review of MPD operations, incorporating the firm's subsequent recommenda-
tions into the MPD Resolution. SeeMPD Resolution, supra note 65, at 2.
67. See id.
68. In a June 1997 survey of District residents' opinion of twenty-seven government serv-
ices, the quality of D.C.'s public schools ranked twenty-six, with 55% of those surveyed rating
the public schools as poor or very poor. See BELDEN & RUSSONELLO RESEARCH AND COM-
MUNICATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C. RESIDENTS STUDY: RESEARCH FINDINGS OFA CITYWIDE SURVEY
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE
AUTHORITY 18, 120 (1997) (providing statistical analysis of District residents' responses to ques-
tions regarding city services). Street repair and maintenance ranked last. Seeid. at 18.
69. Indeed, according to a 1996 report issued by the Authority, the District of Columbia
Public Schools did not know how many persons it employed. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, CHILDREN IN CRISIS: A
REPORT ON THE FAILURE OF D.C.'s PUBLIC SCHOOLS 21 (1996) (providing detailed analysis of
District of Columbia Public Schools' ("DCPS") financial, management, and educational fail-
ings).
70. This is also true when the performance of District students is compared with students
from school districts of similar demographic compositions. For example, the average compos-
ite SAT score for DCPS students in 1995 was 717, as contrasted with Baltimore (723) and Phila-
delphia (740). DCPS students also scored short of the national average (910), and even more
striking, more then 200 points below the average of neighboring school districts (993). See id.
at Statistics, Facts and Figures Page 6 (providing graphical comparison of DCPS SAT scores with
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III. THE D.C. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILrY AND MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT
On April 17, 1995, President Clinton signed the District of Colum-
bia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act
("DCFRA"), creating the "strongest financial oversight authority in
our Nation's history." It was clear that Congress' patience with the
District of Columbia had reached an end: "The problems this legisla-
tion is designed to alleviate now approach horrendous proportions.
The District of Columbia ("The City") is facing its worst crisis in over
a century. Every Member of Congress is familiar with The City's fi-
nancial woes. Many Americans know of its severity."7
With the DCFRA, Congress intended to create a financial control
board that would undertake "[a] comprehensive approach to fiscal,
management, and structural problems.., which exempts no part of
the District government."74 This section examines the functions and
powers Congress provided to the Authority in order that it may un-
dertake this "comprehensive approach" to management reform.
This section also examines the primary legal challenge made to
Authority action under the original DCFRA.
A. Structure of the Authority
The Authority consists of a board of five presidentially-appointed
individuals, including a chairperson, who serve without pay for three-
year terms.75 The DCFRA empowers the Authority and its staf 6 only
during "control periods."" At all other times, the Authority lies in a
those from districts around country).
71. DCFRA, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995).
72. 141 CONG. REc. H4066 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1995) (statement by Mr. Davis). Congress
examined other Control Boards that exist or have existed in several other cities and states. See
H.I. REP. No. 104-96, at 19-22 (1995) (describing experiences of Cleveland, New York City,
Yonkers (N.Y.), Philadelphia, and the Chicago School District with financial control boards).
73. H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 4.
74. DCFRA, Pub. L. No. 104-8, § 2(a) (5), 109 Stat. 97,98 (1995).
75. See id. § 101 (b)-(d) (discussing terms of authority membership). Following the initial
three years, board members' terms become staggered. See id. The current board members are:
Dr. Andrew F. Brimmer (chairman), Stephen D. Harlan, Edward A. Singletary,Joyce A. Ladner,
and Constance B. Newman. See generally David A. Vise, Control Board Chairman Won't Serve Second
Term, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1998, at Al (listing current members and noting Brimmer's and
Singletary's intention to step down after current term expires).
76. The staff of the Authority is headed by an Executive Director, appointed by the chair
with the approval of the other board members. See id. § 102(a). The Executive Director is
authorized to appoint additional paid personnel, with approval of the chair. See id. § 102(b).
The current staff of the Authority numbers approximately thirty-five, and includes an assistant
Executive Director, Chief Financial Officer, four lawyers (including the General Counsel), Me-
dia Coordinator, and support personnel.
77. See id. § 209(b) (1); see also infra Part V.A.3 (providing recommendations concerning
the Sunset Clause in the DCFRA).
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dormant state, allowing the local government established by the
Home Rule Act to proceed normally." A control period was deemed
to exist upon enactment of the DCFRA, and will continue until the
District's budget is balanced for four consecutive years and the Dis-
trict has access to short and long-term credit markets at "reasonable"
interest rates.79
As described above, Congress intended the Authority to investi-
gate, and if necessary, reform, nearly every aspect of the District's
municipal government.80 The essence of this power lies in the
Authority's ability to review and approve all legislation passed by the
Council,8 ' issue recommendations to the mayor and city council,8 re-
view and approve all contracts and leases entered into by the City,
78. A control period is triggered, reactivating the dormant Authority, by any of the follow-
ing seven events: (1) the Mayor requests an advance from the United States Treasury; (2) the
District government fails to contribute sufficiently to a debt service fund established by the
Authority; (3) the District government defaults on a payment to any creditor; (4) the District
government fails, during any pay period, to meet its payroll; (5) when at the end of a quarter in
any fiscal year, the District's estimated expenditures exceed its estimated revenues for the re-
mainder of the fiscal year or the remainder of the fiscal year plus the first six months of the
next fiscal year; (6) the District government fals to make the necessary pensions and benefits
payments for District employees; and (7) the District government defaults on a payment re-
quired as part of an interstate compact. See DCFRA § 209(a) (1)-(a) (7) (defining events which
initiate a control period).
79. See id. § 209(b) (1) (A), (B) (outlining conditions for termination of control period).
Determining what is a "reasonable" interest rate to "meet the District's borrowing needs" inter-
jects a subjective element into the determination of whether a control period has ended. Be-
cause only two factors are necessary to terminate a control period, and one of them is objective
(four consecutive balanced budgets), considerable attention will be focused on the subjective
element of "reasonable interest rates" once the objective criteria is met.
Both the Authority and its critics may manipulate the "reasonableness" language in order to
accomplish either an extension or an early end to a control period. The statute requires the
Authority to make a subjective determination, which may provide the basis for arguing for ex-
tending a control period beyond what critics feel is necessary to accomplish the objectives
mandated by Congress. Alternatively, critics of the Authority may use the subjective nature of
this clause to argue for the early end of a control period after the objective criteria is reached,
despite the need for additional management reforms. See infra Part V.A.3 (recommending
amendment or repeal of DCFRA Sunset Clause provisions).
80. The courts of the District of Columbia, including their officers and employees, are ex-
pressly exempted from Authority control. SeeDCFRA § 2(c) (3)-(4).
81. All Acts passed by the Council and either signed by the Mayor, or re-passed by a two-
thirds majority after a mayoral veto, are sent to the Authority for review. See DCFRA
§ 203(a) (1). The Authority then has seven days to review the Act and the potential financial
impact it will have on the District. See id. § 203(a) (5). If the Authority determines the act to be
.significantly inconsistent" with the District's financial plan and budget, the Authority will no-
tify the Council of the determination, and the Council is forbidden to send the Act to Congress
for final approval. See id. § 203(a) (3) (describing process of approval or rejection of Acts);see
also Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 602(c), 87 Stat. 774, 814 (1973) (codified as
amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-201 to 1-299.7 (1981)) (requiring all Acts passed by Council
to be sent to Congress for approval).
82. See DCFRA § 207 (describing Authority's power to make recommendations); infra Part
III.B (discussing extent of Authority's "recommending" power).
83. See DCFRA § 203(b) (1), (4) (requiring Authority to approve contracts based on their
consistence with District's financial plan and budget, and stating that contracts requiring
Council approval actually be approved by Council before being submitted to Authority for final
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and review and approve the city budget.4
Complementing these powers and responsibilities, the Authority is
authorized to enter into contracts,85 to hold hearings, 6 issue subpoe-
nas,87 and seek judicial enforcement of its actions.ss In addition, the
DCFRA limits the application of D.C. laws to the Authority to only
three sections of the D.C. Code: 9 portions of the D.C. Freedom of
Information Act,90 the Government in the Sunshine Act,9' and por-
tions of the District of Columbia Campaign Finance Reform and
Conflict of Interest Act.92
B. The "Recommending Power" Under the Original DCFRA
As described above, Congress intended to create a control board
with the authority necessary to effect substantial reform of the Dis-
trict's management structure. The recommending power, described
in Section 207 of the DCFRA,1 constitutes the primary statutory vehi-
cle through which the Authority was able to implement permanent
approval).
84. Congress must ultimately adopt the budget for the District of Columbia. The process
of delivering a budget to Congress, however, is perhaps the most complicated and convoluted
of all processes in the District of Columbia. See id. §§ 201-202 (describing budget submission
process). Essentially, both the Mayor and Council have the opportunity to submit a financial
plan and budget to the Authority for certification. If rejected, each may submit a revised plan
and budget. If rejected again, each may submit their uncertified plans to Congress. The
Authority may also submit its own plan to Congress. This complicated process, remedied to
some degree by the D.C. Revitalization Act, discussed infra at Part IV, resulted in three budgets
being submitted to Congress for approval for fiscal year 1998. See Testimony of the Honorable
Marion BarryJr., Mayor, District of Columbia, Before the House Committee on Appropriations
Sub-Committee on the District of Columbia, July 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Cngtst File (describing 1997 budget process and reasons for lack of consensus budget); David
A. Vise, D.C. Budget Battle To Go To Congress; City, Control Board Have Competing Plans, WASH.
POST, June 13, 1997, at Al (citing Washington's loss of credibility in Congress for failure to
submit consensus budget); Editorial, How Not to Write a D.C. Budget, WASH. POST, June 14, 1997,




88. The DCFRA requires any action against the Authority, or action arising from the
DCFRA, to be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See id.
§ 105(a). In addition, the DCFRA prohibits any injunctive or declaratory relief against the
Authority from becoming effective until a final decision is entered in the case, or the opportu-
nity to appeal has expired. See id. § 105(c). Mitigating the unavailability of immediate injunc-
tive relief, the DCFRA requires that any action against the Authority be given expedited con-
sideration by the District Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the United
States Supreme Court. See id. § 105(d).
89. See id. § 108(a) (listing D.C. laws that apply to Authority). This section also prohibits
the Mayor or Council from exercising "any control, supervision, oversight, or review over the
Authority or its activities." Id. § 108(b) (1).
90. D.C. CODEANN. §§ 1-1521 to 1-1526 (1981).
91. Id. § 1-1504.
92. Id. § 1-1461.
93. SeeDCFRA§ 207.
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policy or structural changes in District departments and agencies.9
Specifically, the recommending power allows the Authority to
identify problem areas and issue recommendations for remedial ac-
tion to either the Mayor or Council, or directly to the appropriate
department of government.95 The Mayor or Council (whichever has
authority over the recommended action) then has ninety days to no-
tify the Authority as to whether the District will adopt or reject the
recommendation. 96 If the recommendation is rejected, or approved
but not implemented, the Authority is authorized to take whatever
action is necessary to implement the recommendation, after consul-
tation with the House Committee on Government Reform and Over-
sight and the Senate Committee on Government Affairs in Con-
gress.97 The Authority is thus able to make recommendations and
assure their implementation, exercising both legislative and execu-
tive power in the District.
The Authority's interpretation of its ability to issue recommenda-
tions includes the power to promulgate orders, which would be bind-
ing on D.C. government agencies, without going through the rec-
ommending process delineated in Section 207.9s The DCFRA and
accompanying legislative materials lend some support to this inter-
pretation. The DCFRA refers to "orders" in Section 103(i) (1) (A),
which proscribes criminal penalties for violating valid "orders of the
Authority."9 This section does not, however, establish the ability to
94. As demonstrated by the Lottery Board Order, discussed infra at note 98.
95. Section 207 uses broad language to identify the areas of the D.C. government subject
to the Authority's recommendations: "The Authority may at any time submit recommenda-
tions... to ensure compliance by the District government with a financial plan and budget or
to otherwise promote the financial stability, management responsibility, and service delivery
efficiency of the District government...." DCFRA§ 207(a).
96. Seeid.§207(b)(1).
97. Seeid.§207(c)(1).
98. This interpretation formed the basis for the Authority's action with regard to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Lottery Board. On September 21, 1996, the Authority issued the Resolution,
Recommendations and Order Concerning the Lottery Board ("Lottery Board Order"). Citing declin-
ing revenue, a loss of public confidence, politicization and factionalization, and possible illegal
activity, the Authority issued three recommendations and seven "orders" to the Lottery Board,
Mayor, and Chief Financial Officer of the District of Columbia. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY RESOLUTIONS, REG.
OMMENDATIONS AND ORDER CONCERNING THE LOTTERY BOARD 2-3 (1996) (outlining findings
used in support of Authority's actions).
The recommendations essentially dissolved the Lottery Board and transferred supervision of
its operations and personnel to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. See id. at 3-4. The
seven "orders" focus on forcing the Lottery Board to reinstate the executive director, whom it
had previously dismissed, and to prevent the Board members from destroying office records
before the recommendations were implemented. See id. at 4-5.
99. See DCFRA § 103(i)(1)(A) ("Any officer or employee of the District government who
... takes any action in violation of any valid order of the Authority or fails or refuses to take any
action required by any such order... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.").
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issue orders. One must look elsewhere in the DCFRA to determine
what type of orders the Authority may issue, the violation of which
invokes the penalties described in Section 103(i) (1) (A).'0
Section 207 itself expressly provides an "ordering power" when
Authority recommendations are rejected, allowing the Authority to
"take such action concerning [a rejected] recommendation ... it
deems appropriate... .', Such action certainly encompasses an
"order," but is of limited application since Section 207 grants the
Authority this power only after providing the affected D.C. govern-
ment agency the opportunity to act on its own and after consultation
with Congress.
0 2
Whether or not an "ordering power" can be inferred from the
original DCFRA, Congress clearly intended the Authority, the Mayor,
and the Council to work together to solve the City's problems.'03 The
House Report accompanying the DCFRA anticipated the cooperation
of Washington's elected officials,'" and provided incentive for the
Authority to behave cooperatively in instituting reforms. Tellingly,
the DCFRA made it difficult for the Authority to act unilaterally and
impose recommendations without giving the Council or Mayor the
first opportunity to negotiate a solution. 05
100. This Section may, however, presuppose the existence of an ordering authority. The
reference to "valid orders of the Authority," combined with the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight's insistence that "the Authority have the power necessary to accomplish
the purposes [of the DCFRA]" suggest that an ordering power was intended. See H.R. REP. No.
104-96, at 40 (1995); infra note 103 (describing DCFRA drafters' intent that the Authority have
"absolute" power to implement its recommendations). But see infra note 102 (suggesting that
language of legislative history accompanying "Superpowers" amendment indicates the confer-
ral of a new ordering power).
101. DCFRA§207(c)(1).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. The "Superpowers" Amendment, discussed
infra at Part III.C, expressly grants the Authority the power to issue orders. In conference re-
port accompanying the amendment, the enhancement is described as "providing" the Author-
ity with rule-making power. See H.R. REP. No. 104-863, at 1180 (1996). By using the word
"provide," Congress implies the delegation of a power that had not been previously conferred.
103. Although cooperation was important to the drafters of the DCFRA, the legislative his-
tory of the DCFRA makes it clear that any dispute between D.C. government agencies or
elected officials and the Authority was to be decided in favor of the Authority:
In the event that there is a stalemate, an impasse between the authority and city gov-
ernment, the bill allows the authority to implement its own recommendations,
whether they be executive or legislative in nature. This power is absolute and it is ab-
solutely necessary if the authority is to be effective and have the desired impact on the
efficient operation of District government. This Authority needs to have control It is our
intention that it have control.
141 CONG. REc. H4068 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1995) (statement of Mr. Walsh) (emphasis added).
104. See H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 43 (1995) ("The Committee expects that some of the most
important work of the Authority will be in working with the District government to design rec-
ommendations .... ").
105. The intransigence of D.C.'s local government in instituting financial and management
reform weighed heavily on several Congresspersons. They wanted to be certain that, in the
event that D.C. officials failed to institute the Authority's recommendations, that the Authority
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C. The "Superpowers"Amendment
On September 30, 1996, an amendment to the DCFRA was passed
that dramatically increased the Authority's ability to effect manage-
ment reform in the District.0 6 Passed quickly and with no floor de-
bate,1'0 the "Superpowers" amendment added a short subsection to
Section 207 of the DCFRA:
[T] he Authority may at any time issue such orders, rules, or regula-
tions as it considers appropriate to carry out the purposes of this
Act and the amendments made by this Act, to the extent that the
issuance of such an order, rule, or regulation is within the authority of
the Mayor or the head of any department or agency of the District govern-
ment, and any such order, rule, or regulation shall be legally bind-
ing to the same extent as if issued by the Mayor or the head of any
such department or agency.108
The new Section 207(d) (1) allows the Authority to "stand in the
shoes" of the Mayor or any department or agency head and issue any
would have full executive and legislative powers to institute them. Thus, there was the following
exchange between Senators William V. Roth and William S. Cohen regarding the Section 207
recommending powers:
Mr. Roth: I have been concerned that the bill does not make clear our intent that the
(Authority] will have sufficient authority to ensure that its recommendations are
adopted. I have thought that such authority should be expressly stated in the statute,
in order to leave no ambiguity in enacting section 207. Is it the Senator's belief that
the intention of Congress is sufficiently clear, nonetheless, that the Authority may im-
plement any recommendations it has made to the Mayor or Council, but were re-
jected?
Mr. Cohen: Yes it is. [I]t is clearly the intent of this section to give the Authority as
broad a range of legislative, executive, and administrative powers as the Mayor and Council
possess, while expecting that the District government will be given the opportunity to
act first.
141 CONG. REc. S5517 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (statements of Sens. Roth and Cohen)
(emphasis added). Seeking approval of the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight as well as the Senate Committee on Government Affairs would likely take time, per-
haps more time, Congress hoped, then simply negotiating with the District's elected officials to
reach a compromise on the proposed recommendation.
106. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.)
3009-500 (1996).
107. Discussion of this dramatic increase in the Authority's power is limited to one sentence
in the Conference Report accompanying Public Law 104-208:
Subsection (f) provides the control board with rule-making authority to carry out the
purposes of Public Law 104-8 and waives all judicial review as to the authority of the
control board to issue orders, rules, or regulations but does not waive judicial review
as to the content of the orders, rules, or regulations.
H.R. REP. No. 104-863, at 1182 (1996); see also Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility
& Management Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (interpreting the pre-
clusion of judicial review provision to apply only to the Authority's internal decision making
process and not to the content of individual orders).
108. DCFRA § 207, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 5203, 110 Stat. 3009, 3501-03
(1996) (emphasis added).
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orders within their power to issue.9 The amendment does not,
however, provide the Authority with the power to issue orders or per-
form functions reserved to the Council by the Home Rule Act."0 For
reasons discussed below, this relatively small amendment has shown a
great potential for diminishing Home Rule."'
1. Authority action concerning the D. C. Board of Education
The Authority's first exercise of its new power occurred on No-
vember 15, 1996, when it ordered the transfer of the bulk of the
power and responsibilities of the District's elected Board of Educa-
tion... to a new "Emergency Transitional Education Board of Trus-
109. SeePub. L. No. 104-208, § 5203(f), 110 Stat. 3009, 3502 (1996).
110. While the Superpowers amendment provides the Authority with a broad new ability to
effect changes in the District, it limits the scope of these orders to those within the authority of
the Mayor or other Executive branch agencies to issue. SeeDCFRA § 207(d), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 5203(0 (1996); see also Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility &
Management Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that the authority
provided by Section 207(d) to "stand in the Mayor's shoes" does not apply to the D.C. Coun-
cil).
111. The word "potential" is used because the full power of this amendment has not yet
been exercised. The Authority's action with regard to the D.C. public schools, discussed supra
at Part II.C is the principal action taken thus far by the Authority utilizing this new"ordering
power," and resulted in the takeover of the D.C. Public School System. The D.C. Revitalization
Act, passed in August, 1997, required the Authority to take over nine additional government
agencies, but provided its own statutory basis for the action. See infra Part IV (discussing D.C.
Revitalization Act).
In the absence of any legislative history expounding on the purpose of the 207(d)(1)
amendment, speculation over Congress' motivation for expanding the DCFRA yields two pos-
sibilities. First, Congress may have deemed the DCFRA as not providing an "ordering power"
other than the Authority's ability to implement rejected recommendations, and recognizing
that such an ordering power is necessary for the Authority to carry out its mandate to reform
the D.C. government in general, and the public schools in particular. The legislation accom-
panying the 207(d)(1) amendment in Public Law 104-208 also transfers approximately
$40,700,000 to the Authority to be used for improving public school facilities. See Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 5201 (1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-863, at 1178 (1996) (describing conferees
intention that Authority manage funds allocated for facilities improvement). Congress may
have felt the ordering power necessary to ensure the Authority's ability to institute rapid
changes in the public schools and other parts of the government, without relying on the
lengthy process of issuing recommendations.
The second possible explanation for the expansion of the DCFRA is that Congress was
merely clarifying a power it intended the Authority to have under the original DCFRA. Clearly
this is the position the Authority takes, as demonstrated by its pre-207(d) (1) Lottery Board Or-
der. Coincidentally, the Lottery Board Order was issued on September 21, 1996, just nine days
before the 207(d) (1) amendment was passed. Presumably, a new order by the Authority, citing
its new 207(d) (1) ordering ability as the basis for the same action as taken by the Lotlery Board
Order, would render moot any argument that the Authority acted ultravires.
112. The Home Rule Act provides for an eleven-member board of education to be elected
on a non-partisan basis. See Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 495, 87 Stat. 774 (1973)
(codified as amended at D.C. CODEANN. §§ 1-201 to 1-299.7 (1981)). The Home Rule Act also
provides for a layer of insulation separating the Board of Education from the new municipal
agencies, departments, and officials; Congress designated the Board of Education an
"independent agency," thus preventing Mayoral or Council intrusions in this area. Seeid.
The D.C. Code defines an independent agency as "any agency of the government of the Dis-
trict with respect to which the Mayor and the Council are not authorized by law, other than this
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tees" ("Board of Trustees") 3 Although it surfaced strong emotions
from D.C. community activists, the Authority's action was initially
upheld as a legitimate exercise of its statutory authority in Shook v.
District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance
Authority.1
4
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit also recognized the sweeping powers
Congress had granted the Authority in Section 207(d) (1).115  In a
blow that was more political than substantive,"6 the Court rejected a
portion of the reasoning used by the Authority'1 7 to effectuate the
transfer of power from the elected Board of Education to the new
Board of Trustees." 8 Because these opinions are likely to impact fu-
ture Authority actions," 9 the School Board Order and the Shook chal-
lenge will be discussed in detail.
a. The Authority's mandate in education
The Authority's mandate to reform the District of Columbia Public
Schools emanates from the DCFRA and the reports accompanying
both the DCFRA and the Superpowers amendment. Both reports re-
fer directly to the chronic problems in the District's schools, and
both anticipate that their accompanying legislation will allow the
subchapter, to establish administrative procedures." D.C. CODEANN. § 1-1502(5) (1981).
Four other District agencies were so designated: the Zoning Commission, the Armory
Board, the Public Service Commission, and the Board of Elections and Ethics. See Home Rule
Act §§ 491-495.
113. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE
AUTHORITY, RESOLUTION, ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 10 (1996) [hereinafter SCHOOL BOARD ORDER] (limiting functions of
Board of Education to providing "input, advice, counsel and guidance" on matters of educa-
tion in District).
The same day, members of the District of Columbia Board of Education sought a Temporary
Restraining Order ("TRO") from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
to enjoin the Authority from taking any action affecting the "structure or responsibilities of the
Board of Education." Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Assis-
tance Auth., 964 F. Supp. 416, 419 (D.D.C. 1997), afj'd in part and rev'd in part, 132 F.3d 775
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The TRO was rejected. See Order Denying Temporary Restraining Order,
Shook, 964 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1996) (No. 96-2601) (denying Plaintiffs' request for TRO).
114. 964 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1997).
115. See infra Parts III.C.1, III.C.2 (describing D.C. Circuit opinion).
116. The plaintiffs in Shook made much of the partial reversal ofJudge Kessler's decision in
the District Court. The D.C. Circuit opinion leaves unquestioned, however, the Authority's
ability to run the schools. See infra Part III.C.2.b (describing structural changes in public
schools implemented as a result of the Shook decision).
117. See infra note 131 (describing process used by the Authority to create the "Emergency
Transitional Education Board of Trustees" ("Board of Trustees"), and to empower the Board
with the powers and responsibilities of the elected Board of Education).
118. See infra Part III.C.2.a (discussing D.C. Circuit's decision in Shook).
119. No additional departments or agencies have been taken over by the Authority under
its 207(d) (1) ordering power. This inaction, as discussed infra at notes 170-72 and accompany-
ing text, was one of the reasons Congress passed the D.C. Revitalization Act, which forced the
Authority to take over most of the District government.
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Authority to address those problems.' 0
In furtherance of this mandate, the Authority performed a bottom-
121up review of the D.C. Public School System. Wielding the results of
the study as support for its impending action, '22 the Authority an-
nounced on November 15, 1996, that it was replacing the existing
superintendent '2 with a "CEO-Superintendent"'2 4 and appointing the
Board of Trustees. '25 The new Board of Trustees would exercise most
of the authority then possessed by the elected Board of Education for
an "emergency" period endingJune 30, 2000.126
b. Mechanics of the School Board Order
The structure of the School Board Order is significant because it
could serve as a template for future Authority takeovers or restructur-
ings. Indeed, the legal reasoning used by the Authority to achieve
the desired power structure in the D.C. public schools was strongly
ratified by the U.S. District Court in Shook v. District of Columbia Finan-
cial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority.2 7  On appeal,
120. See DCFRA, Pub. L. No. 104-8, § 2(a) (2), 109 Stat. 97, 98 (1995) (describing District's
failure to provide a decent education for its citizens); H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 38-39 (1995)
("The Committee fully intends that the Authority will carefully examine the operation of the
School Board and include it in the necessary actions to solve the District's budget, fiscal, and
management problems."); H.R. REP. No. 104-863, at 1178 (1996) (expressing desire of confer-
ees that "strong and immediate action" be taken in public schools); see also SCHOOL BOARD
ORDER, supra note 113, at 1-5 (relating abysmal conditions in public schools as findings which
support the Authority's action).
121. The information gathered by the Authority was assembled into a scathing report on
D.C. public schools. The report, Children in Crisis: A Report on the Failure of D.C. 's Public Schools,
was made public in November, 1995. See Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility &
Management Assistance Auth., 964 F. Supp. 416, 420 (D.D.C. 1997) (discussing issuance of this
report).
122. The School Board Order cites the findings of Children in Crisis extensively as support
for its action. See SCHOOL BOARD ORDER, supra note 113, at 1-4 (relating findings of poor edu-
cational opportunities and substandard learning environments for children in D.C. public
schools).
123. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 5204(a) (1996) (providing the Authority with power to de-
clare any District employee's services "no longer required").
124. See SCHOOL BOARD ORDER, supra note 113, at 7. The CEO-Superintendent was identi-
fied as an agent of the Authority and a member of the Board of Trustees. See id.
125. See id. at 56.
126. See id. at 6 (identifying length of the "emergency" period). The School Board Order
requires that the nine-member Board of Trustees consist of five appointees of the Authority, an
appointee of the Authority chosen from a list of three parents of school children submitted by
the Mayor, an appointee of the Authority chosen from a list of three teachers in the D.C. public
schools submitted by the Council, the CEO-Superintendent, and the President of the D.C.
Board of Education. See id. at 5-6. Thus, eight of the nine members of the Board of Trustees
were to be selected by the Authority.
The elected Board of Education retained authority over the District's charter schools, and
the ability to provide "input, advice, counsel, guidance, reports and recommendations on gen-
eral educational policy." Id. at 10 (designating Board of Education as an "eligible chartering
authority for Public Charter Schools" and listing other functions).
127. 964 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1997).
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the D.C. Circuit largely affirmed the District Court, recognizing Con-
gress' intent that the Authority have the "extraordinary" power nec-
essary to remedy the various crises in the public schools. 8
For the Authority to accomplish the objectives set out in the
School Board Order it had to establish its ability to issue orders to
independent agencies. 2 9  The Authority argued that the term
"agency" as used in the text of the 207(d) (1) amendment encom-
passes any sub-category of agency, including independent agencies. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District
Court's acceptance of this argument in Shook'5
After establishing its statutory authority to issue orders to the
Board of Education, the Authority performed a series of power dele-
gations designed to reallocate responsibility for the public schools to
the new Board of Trustees and CEO-Superintendent.'3' The resulting
fully-empowered Board of Trustees had the necessary power, the
128. See Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility & Management Assistance Auth.,
132 F.3d 775, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1998). While the D.C. Circuit rejects a portion of the delegation
process used by the Authority, its opinion appears to contain significant legal and factual er-
rors, indicating that it is likely to be narrowly construed and eventually, distinguished into
oblivion. See, e.g., D.C. Lottery Board Chairman v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility &
Management Assistance Auth., No. 96-2273 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1998) (order denying preliminary
injunction) (refusing to declare an Authority order overruling a Lottery Board decision ultra
vires in light of Shook); see also infra Part III.C for a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
Shook.
129. See supra note 112 (listing other independent agencies).
130. See Shook, 132 F.3d at 787-90 (recognizing Congress' intent that the Authority's 207(d)
power encompass independent agencies, and stating that if Congress intended to exempt in-
dependent agencies from Authority orders it could have so stated). Section 207(d) (1) allows
the Authority to issue any order that the head of any agency is capable of issuing, and states that
such an order is binding on that agency. See supra text accompanying note 108 (citing Super-
power amendment).
131. To create the new Board of Trustees and CEO-Superintendent position, and vest them
with much of the power of the elected Board of Education, the Authority relied on D.C. Code
§ 31-107. This Section allows the Board of Education to delegate any of its authority to the Su-
perintendent, and the Superintendent is permitted to re-delegate any of his or her authority
granted by the Board of Education. The Authority, interpreting any to include all, ordered the
Board of Education to delegate most of its authority to the Superintendent, and from the Su-
perintendent to the new Board of Trustees: "[T]he authority of the Board of Education shall
be delegated to the Board of Trustees through and pursuant to D.C. Code Section 31-107."
SCHOOL BOARD ORDER, supra note 113, at 7 (emphasis added).
Although the wording in the School Board Order is not explicit in its description of the
delegation process, the Order's reference to D.C. Code § 31-107 and the words "through and
pursuant to" are clearly intended to refer the legal-minded reader to the appropriate source of
authority. At least the District Court in Shook followed the Authority's reasoning. After explain-
ing the series of delegations necessary to accomplish the Authority's intended result, the Court
held, "the delegation, when undertaken by the Control Board, standing in the Board of Educa-
tion's shoes, must also be lawful under [DCFRA] section 207(d)." Shook, 964 F. Supp. at 429.
But see Shook, 132 F.3d at 783 (stating that if the intent of the Authority was to transfer authority
from the Board of Education to the Board of Trustees through the Superintendent, then the
School Board Order was "not phrased in appropriate terms."). On appeal, however, the D.C.
Circuit took a different view of some of these delegations. See supra Part III.C (discussing D.C.
Circuit's opinion).
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Authority believed, to undertake substantive reforms aimed at fixing
the public school system, subject to the supervision of the Author-
ity.
2. The Shook case and future Authority actions
a. The D.C. Circuit's opinion in Shook
As described above, the School Board Order created a new Tem-
porary Emergency Education Board of Trustees, vesting its members
with the bulk of the elected Board of Education's powers. To ac-
complish the necessary delegation of authority, the Authority "stood
in the shoes" of the Board of Education and, pursuant to D.C. Code
§ 31-107, delegated its powers and responsibilities to the new Board
of Trustees.'3
Although the language of the School Board Order is not explicit
on whether the Authority contemplated a direct delegation of power
from the elected Board to the Board of Trustees or a delegation in
which the necessary authority passes through the Superintendent,
13 4
the D.C. Circuit rejected both scenarios.13 The court stated that the
Authority's delegation scheme violated "the structure that Congress
created to run the D.C. schools.' 36 Herein lies the fundamental er-
ror permeating much of the opinion: Congress did not create this struc-
ture. The portion of D.C. Code § 31-107 dealing with delegation of
authority does not originate from an Act of Congress, as the opinion
states, but an Act of the Council of the District of Columbia.' 7
132. The School Board Order required the Board of Trustees to report to the Authority
with respect to:
[i]ts activities and performance, the nature of the reforms which it has instituted, the
effect these reforms have had Eon] the operation and administration of the public
school system and the performance of students, teachers, and staff of the public
school system, and on such other matters as the Authority or the Board of Trustees
deem necessary or appropriate to help assure continuing improvement in the public
school system.
SCHOOL BOARD ORDER, supra note 113, at 9. The School Board Order expressly designates the
Board of Trustees "as agents of the Authority." Id. at 5.
133. D.C. Code § 31-107 states, in pertinent part: "The Board of Education is authorized to
delegate any of its authority to the Superintendent. The Superintendent is authorized to re-
delegate any of his or her authority subject to the approval of the Board."
134. The Authority argued in Shook that although D.C. Code § 31-107 does not expressly
permit delegation from the Board of Education directly to a third party, the statute should not
be read as prohibitingit. SeeShook, 132 F.3d at 782.
135. Despite the D.C. Circuit's difficulty determining the Authority's intended pattern of
delegation, it would seem that the School Board Order's invocation of § 31-107 indicates a
delegation in which authority passes through the Superintendent to the Board of Trustees; the
statute expressly allows for this type of delegation. A direct delegation would be outside the
scope of § 31-107, thereby rendering its invocation in the School Board Order meaningless.
136. Id. at 782-83.
137. D.C. Code § 31-107 amends two Acts of Congress dealing with D.C. public schools. See
10151998]
1016 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:993
The portion of the Shook opinion dealing with the Authority's
delegation to the Board of Trustees is largely based on its interpreta-
tion of a local D.C. Act mistakenly given the weight of an Act of Con-
gress. Because the District Court interpreted the statute as a matter
of first impression, and the D.C. Circuit chose to disregard this inter-
pretation, a better course would have been to certify the issue to the
D.C. Court of Appeals for clarification.' s
The misclassification of D.C. Code § 31-107 as an Act of Congress
is significant because the Court interprets the Authority's delegation
as "inconsistent with congressional intent.",3 9 In fact, the only congres-
sional intent implicated by the Authority's delegation is found in the
legislative history cited by the Court, which emphasizes Congress' de-
sire that the Authority reform the school system. 4'
In short, the D.C. Circuit's opinion is based in part on a false
premise regarding the origin of D.C. Code § 31-107.' 41 If the Court
disagreed with the District Court's interpretation, the matter could
have been certified to the appropriate local court with the expertise
to render an official interpretation. As it stands, the Court's opinion
Act ofJune 20, 1906, 34 Stat. 317, ch. 3446, § 3 (providing Superintendent with authority over
"all matters pertaining to the instruction in all schools under the Board of Education"), as
amended by Act of April 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 102. The D.C. Council's modification of those Acts
contains the first provision regarding delegation of authority. See D.C. Law 2-139 § 3204 (h), 25
D.C. Reg. 5740, 6056 (1978). The § 31-107 provision permitting the Superintendent to dele-
gate authority received from the Board of Education is not an Act of Congress. As stated above,
this error is repeated throughout the opinion and clearly affects the legal reasoning on which
the Court bases its rejection of the Authority's delegation to the Board of Trustees: "It is un-
likely that Congress drafted section 31-107 to reassure doubters that a Superintendent could in-
deed be the beneficiary of some general power of delegation possessed by the Board of Educa-
tion .... ."; "[CQongress provided that the Board of Education could delegate to its subordinate
executive, the Superintendent"; "[i]t would be unusual, if not unprecedented, for Congress to
authorize the Board of Education to delegate its own governing authority... to another outside
multi-member body"; "The Control Board's notion is inconsistent with the hierarchical frame-
work Congress provided." Shook, 132 F.3d at 782-83 (emphasis added).
138. See D.C. CODE § 11-723(a) (1981) (allowing certification to D.C. Court of Appeals
from U.S. Courts of Appeals when the certified question of law may be "determinative of the
cause pending in such certifying court" and there is no controlling precedent in the D.C. Court
of Appeals).
139. Shook, 132 F.3d at 783.
140. See id. at 781 ("We think the Control Board can, by using section 207 (d), assume any or
all of the Board of Education's powers, and once it does so it surely 'occupies the field.'"); see
also supra note 121 (citing legislative history indicating Congress' intent that the Authority take
immediate action to reform the D.C. public schools).
141. See Shook, 132 F.3d at 781-82. The Court also found the Authority's dismissal of the
Superintendent to be "contrary to law": "For one thing, the Control Board, acting in the stead
of the Board of Education, summarily fired the Superintendent without even mentioning a
cause as required by section 31-110." Id. The Court presumes that the Authority was "acting in
the stead of the Board of Education" when the Superintendent was fired. The School Board
Order clearly states, however, that the Authority determined that the "services and employ-
ment" of the Superintendent were "no longer required" pursuant to Section 5024(a) of Public
Law 104-208. Needless to say, Section 5024(a) does not require the Authority to state a"cause"
before taking this action. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 5024(a) (1997).
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is at war with itself. The Court recognizes Congress' intent that the
Authority have the "extraordinary" power necessary to remedy the
various crises in the public schools.12 The Court also recognizes that
the Home Rule Act can be "modified either expressly or impliedly by
Congress," and indeed identifies implied modifications to the Act
necessary for the "ordering power" to have the effect Congress in-
tended.' Yet when the Authority delegated the Board of Educa-
tion's responsibilities to the Board of Trustees vis-a-vis the Superin-
tendent, the Court rejects the transfer on the grounds that the
"organizational structure" envisioned by Congress (actually the D.C.
Council) was violated. 4
b. Authority action post-Shook
On February 12, 1998, the Authority issued the Second Resolution
and Order Concerning District of Columbia Public School System
("Revised School Board Order").145 The new Order states openly that
its issuance was predicated by the D.C. Circuit decision and is an at-
tempt to "effectuate the decision of the panel." The Revised School
Board Order makes two significant changes from the original. First,
the Authority assumed "all the authority, powers, functions, duties,
responsibilities, exemptions, and immunities of the Board of Educa-
tion.' 47 Under the original School Board Order, the Board of Trus-
tees assumed responsibility "for the operation and management of
the District of Columbia school system." ' The second and most sig-
nificant modification made by the revised order assigns the Board of
Trustees the task of making recommendations to the Authority.
49
The new order states that "great weight" shall be accorded recom-
142. Shook, 132 F.3d at 784 (rejecting appellants' argument that takeover of the school sys-
tem jeopardizes the structure established by Congress in the Home Rule Act).
143. See id. at 780.
144. See id. at 783. As for Congress' actual intent, the legislative history accompanying Sec-
tion 207(d) (1) anticipates a broad interpretation, at least an interpretation that would allow a
reform of the District's public schools. See supra note 130 (describing intended extent of the
207(d)(1) amendment's authority); supra note 121 (setting out Congressional intent for
Authority action in the public schools); see also Associated Gen'l Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,530 (1983), quoted inShook, 964 F. Supp. at 425 ("A proper
interpretation of the section cannot... ignore the larger context in which the entire statute
was debated."); Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that Con-
gress' intentions for statute are understood only after examining context in which it was en-
acted).
145. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE
AUTHORITY, SECOND RESOLUTION AND ORDER CONCERNING DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC
SCHOOL &STEM (1998) [hereinafter REVISED SCHOOL BOARD ORDER].
146. See zd. at 1.
147. See ad. at 2.
148. See SCHOOL BOARD ORDER, supra note 113, at 5.
149. See REVISED SCHOOL BOARD ORDER, supra note 145, at 2.
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mendations from the Board of Trustees and that the current compo-
sition of the Board would remain the same.'"°
These two significant changes bring the Authority's School Board
Order into compliance with the D.C. Circuit opinion in Shook. In-
deed, the Shook court expressly recommended this type of arrange-
ment.
The Control Board might wish to call upon others in the community
to provide advice as to the Control Board's exercise of its authority
over the D.C. schools. It may wish to use a body with the prestige and
expertise of the Board of Trustees to fill that role, reconstituted per-
haps as an advisory board charged with recommending certain ac-
tions and policies to the Control Board. 5'
Prior to the Court's decision in Shook, the Authority potentially
could have drastically altered the structure of the District of Colum-
bia, even establishing a City Manager form of government and se-
verely limiting the Mayor's authority. The D.C. Code provides the
Mayor with the power to delegate any of his or her responsibilities or
powers to any director of an Executive agency or office.'52 Thus, the
Authority could have issued an order delegating the bulk of the
Mayor's authority to a new Office of the City Manager, designated as
an "executive agency," which would report only to the Authority.53
Despite the Shook opinion's apparent aversion to Authority delega-
tions of power to third parties, the opinion, for reasons stated above,
will probably be interpreted narrowly so as to apply only to the D.C.
public schools.""
Although the Superpowers amendment provides the Authority
with enormous power to require changes in the District, it does not
go as far as it could have. The amendment continues to require the
Authority to utilize its recommending powers to implement changes
in areas under Council control. In addition, the amendment does
not require the ordering power to be used. 55 The Authority is free to
150. See id.
151. Shook, 132 F.3d at 784.
152. The D.C. Code states that the Mayor may delegate any of his or her authority, with the
exception of the responsibility for signing/vetoing legislation passed by the Council and ap-
proving contracts between the District and the federal government. See D.C. CODE § 1-422
(1981 & Supp. 1997) (setting out powers and responsibilities of the Mayor). Both of these ex-
cepted responsibilities, however, were already subject to Authority oversight. See supra notes 81,
83 (citing Authority's responsibility to approve all legislation and contracts entered into by Dis-
trict of Columbia).
153. The D.C. Revitalization Act, discussed infra at Part IV, provides for essentially the same
Authority control.
154. See supra III.C.2.a and accompanying text (analyzing Shook opinion and its impact on
other Authority actions).
155. The D.C. Revitalization Act, discussed infra at Part IV, required immediate Authority
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use it as leverage, however, by motivating District officials to imple-
ment reforms that, absent the threat of receiving an order, they
might be reluctant to act on."6
IV. THE 1997 DISTRIcT OF COLUMBIA REVrrALIZATION ACT
Widely proclaimed by D.C. Mayor Marion Barry as "the rape of
democracy,' 57  the National Capital Revitalization and Self-
Government Improvement Act of 1997 l 8 was signed into law by
President Clinton around noon on April 5, 1997. Approximately two
hours later, the Authority held a public meeting announcing the
D.C. Revitalization Act's immediate implementation.159
A. Overview of the D. C. Revitalization Act
At just under 100 pages, the D.C. Revitalization Act relieves the
District government of significant financial obligations, but also re-
action.
156. After the School Board Order and the decision upholding its application in most cir-
cumstances, Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Assistance Auth., 132
F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1998), it was clear that the Mayor and heads of D.C. departments and agen-
cies could be ordered to comply with the Authority's reform efforts. Prior to 207(d) (1), the
Mayor could virtually ignore Authority recommendations, knowing that it would be at least
ninety days before the Authority could go to Congress seeking approval to take action on its
own.
On February 26, 1997, a new spirit of cooperation appeared to overcome the Mayor as he
voluntarily relinquished control over the Metropolitan Police Department. See MARION BARRY,
JR., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DELEGATION OF PERSONNEL
ATYrHoRry IN THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT TO THE CHIEF OF POLICE, MAYOR'S
ORDER 97-43 (1997) (providing Chief of Police with control over promotions and disciplinary
action in MPD); MPD Resolution, supra note 65, at 3 (delegating to MPD Chief of Police the
power to request that the Authority terminate those officers whose "employment was no longer
needed").
157. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. After initially calling the Act "a big win for
the District," D.C.'s non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives, Eleanor Holmes Nor-
ton, later retracted that statement and has denounced the legislation. See Patricia F. Eaton,
Shame and Blame; Get a Grip, Eleanor. Your Stand on Home Rule Was Right the First Time, WASH.
POST, Aug. 17, 1997, at C1 (suggesting that many D.C. residents were pleased to see Norton's
initial support for D.C. Revitalization Act); Eleanor Holmes Norton, Editorial, The Loss is Per-
sonal, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1997, at A19 (explaining her change of position on D.C. Revitaliza-
tion Act).
158. D.C. Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
159. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE
AUTHORITY, ORDER OFAUGUST 5, 1997 (implementing National Capital Revitalization and Self-
Government Improvement Act of 1997). The announcement was made in a public meeting
held near the Authority's offices. Present were several dozen protesters who heckled Authority
Chairman Dr. Andrew F. Brimmer as he read his prepared statement. Eventually, a large group
of protesters stormed the stage and had to be dispersed by several dozen officers of the Metro-
politan Police Department. The meeting ultimately adjourned early after a bomb threat was
received. SeeTranscript, Public Meeting of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Man-
agement Assistance Authority, Aug. 5, 1997, at 3-5, 28 (recording numerous interruptions and dis-
ruptions of meeting); Hamil R. Harris, Home Rule Activists Disrupt Control Board Meeting, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 1997, at A6 (reporting disruptions and arrests at public meeting).
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lieves its elected leaders of control over a large portion of the District
government.
Subtitle B160 of the D.C. Revitalization Plan, titled "District of Co-
lumbia Management Reform Act of 1997,161 subjects nine depart-
ments of the government to a new reform system.'62 The system re-
quired the Authority to contract with private consultants within
ninety days to develop "management reform plans" for each of the
nine departments.ss For each management reform plan developed
by the consultants, a "management reform team" was created to co-
ordinate its implementation through the individual department
160. In addition to subtitle B, described in the text, the D.C. Revitalization Act contains
seven other subtitles. Each makes substantial changes to either the structure or financial obli-
gations of the District government.
Subtitle A, the "District of Columbia Retirement Protection Act of 1997," relieves the D.C.
government of nearly $4.8 billion in unfunded pension liabilities for police officers, firefight-
ers, teachers andjudges. See D.C. Revitalization Act §§ 11001-11002.
Subtitle C, titled "Criminal Justice," will transfer responsibility for the District's sentenced
felons to the federal Bureau of Prisons, close the Lorton Correctional Complex, and requires
at least 50% of the District's sentenced felons to be housed in private correctional institutions
by September 30, 2003. See id. § 11201. Subtitle C also transfers financing of the local D.C.
court system to the federal government. Seeid. §§ 11241-11242.
Subtitle D, "Privatization of Tax Collection and Administration," authorizes the Chief Finan-
cial Officer of the District to enter into private contracts for tax collection. See id. § 11302.
Subtitle E, "Financing of District of Columbia Accumulated Deficit," provides the District
with access to intermediate-term advances from the U.S. Treasury for the purpose of liquidat-
ing the District's accumulated operating deficit. See id. §§ 11402-11405; see also id. § 602(a)
(authorizing advance of funds provided the District has balanced budget by 1998).
Subtitle F, "District of Columbia Bond Financing Improvements," updates the "bond
authorization provision" of the Home Rule Act to conform with "changes in the municipal se-
curities marketplace." See id. § 11502(1).
Subtitle G, "District of Columbia Government Budget" reduces the annual federal contribu-
tion to the District to $190,000,000 for 1998, requires the District to submit a balanced budget
for fiscal year 1998, streamlines the process for preparing and submitting an annual budget to
Congress, and increases the maximum amount the District is able to borrow. See id. §§ 11601-
11604.
Subtitle H, "Miscellaneous Provisions," requires the Authority to review all D.C. regulations,
permit, and application processes for the purpose of revising or repealing those which "impair
economic development or financial stability" in the District of Columbia. See id. § 11701(a),
(b).
161. Id.§11101.
162. See id. § 11102(b). The nine departments are: (1) Administrative Services; (2) Con-
sumer and Regulatory Affairs; (3) Corrections; (4) Employment Services; (5) Fire and Emer-
gency Medical Services; (6) Housing and Community Development; (7) Human Services; (8)
Public Works; and (9) Public Health.
Noticeably absent from this list are the Metropolitan Police Department and the D.C. Public
Schools. The Authority explained this omission as a recognition that it had already taken ac-
tion in these areas, e.g., the MPD Order, supra at 65, and the School Board Order, discussed su-
pra at Part III.C.1. See Transcript, Public Meeting of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility
and Management Assistance Authority, Aug. 5, 1997, at 5 (statement of Chairman Brimmer)
(suggesting omission of these two departments was result of Authority's previous efforts).
163. See D.C. Revitalization Act § 11103(b). The Act required the private consultants to
submit the plans within a maximum of 120 days. See id. § 11103(c) (authorizing the Authority
to carry out the contracts).
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heads. "' Most importantly, department heads now report to the
Authority.
165
In addition to requiring the development of management reform
plans, Congress also changed the appointment procedures for the
nine affected department heads.'6 Initially, the Revitalization Act
removed the Council from the appointment process, only to partially
restore their role in confirming Mayoral nominations in a subse-
quent Act. 167 The new legislation also specifies that any of the nine
department heads may be removed only by the Authority, or by the
Mayor with Authority approval.'68
B. Impact of the D.C. Revitalization Act's Management Reforms
Why did Congress require the takeover of nine D.C. government
agencies when the Superpowers amendment potentially provided the
necessary authority to effect the same action?'6 Indications of Con-
gress' frustration with the slow pace of the Authority's reform ef-
forts70 and the continued intransigence of Washington's elected poli-
ticians demonstrate an intention on the part of Congress to force the
164. See id. § 11104(a). The management reform teams consist of the Chair of the Author-
ity or designee, the Chair of the Council or designee, the Mayor or designee, and the head of
the department involved. See id.
165. Seeid.§ 11104(b)(3).
166. Seeid.§ 11105.
167. Under the Revitalization Act, the Authority submits a recommendation to the Mayor
for appointment as head of one of the nine departments of government. See id.
§ 11105(a)(1)(A)(i). The Mayor then nominates an individual, notifies the Council of the
nomination, and submits the name to the Authority for approval. See id. § 11105(a) (1) (A) (iv).
If the Mayor does not make a nomination within thirty days of a vacancy, the Authority can ap-
point an individual to the position. See id. § 11105(a) (1) (B). This process essentially forces the
Mayor to submit a name he or she knows will be accepted by the Authority. Otherwise, the
process begins again, continuing until the Mayor makes a selection that meets with the Author-
ity's approval. See id. The 1998 Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia modifies this
process by restoring the Council's ability to approve the Mayor's department head selection.
Those nominees confirmed by the Council then must be approved by the Authority. See Dis-
trict of Columbia Appropriations Act for 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 131, 111 Stat. 2160, 2174.
168. The Authority possessed this power prior to the new legislation. See supra note 141
(describing Authority's ability under the 207(d) (1) amendments to determine the employment
by the District government of any individual "no longer required").
169. The answer to this question may prove pivotal in a future lawsuit against the Authority.
Congressional intent, as expressed in the legislative history of the 207(d) (1) amendment, was
relied on by the District Court in Shook when it affirmed the School Board Order. See Shook v.
District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Assistance Auth., 964 F. Supp. 416,
420 (D.D.C. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 132 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing importance
of interpreting statute in light of its accompanying legislative history). Future challenges to
Authority action under the D.C. Revitalization Act may be similarly upheld if the legislative his-
tory demonstrates Congress' intent that it be interpreted broadly. Butsee Shook, 132 F.3d at 783-
84 (rejecting Authority's delegation process despite clear legislative intent that the Authority
reform the public schools).
170. See Michael Powell & David A. Vise, A Stern Taskmasterfor the District, WASH. POST, Sept.
17, 1997, at Al (describing Congressman Taylor's frustration at the "glacial pace of reform
[that] would exasperate the patience ofJob").
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Authority to take more drastic action. 7' Alternatively, Congress may
have enacted the D.C. Revitalization Act to provide some degree of
legal certainty to the Authority's anticipated restructuring of munici-
pal agencies.'7
The municipal structure which emerged under the D.C. Revitaliza-
tion Act was one in which the Authority oversaw the daily operation
of the District government through the department heads it ap-
proved.'1 The Authority's selection of a "Chief Management Officer"
("CMO")1 74 may have relieved the necessity of constant direct contact
171. The placing of time limits on Authority execution of the Management Reforms indi-
cates Congress' concern that the Authority was "dragging its feet."
172. See id. An order from the Authority implementing a City Manager system would have
effected the same basic structure as that created by the D.C. Revitalization Act; the heads of the
major District departments would report to a "city manager," who would in turn report to the
Authority. Such an order would undoubtedly result in a lawsuit, tying up valuable resources.
See, e.g., Shook, 964 F. Supp. at 427-29 (challenging the Authority's School Board Order);
Brewer v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Assistance Auth., 953 F.
Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1997) (challenging the Authority's Lottery Board Order); University of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Faculty Assoc. v. Board of Trustees, No. 97-1080, 1998 WL 51198 (D.D.C. Feb.
3, 1998) (challenging Authority's order to cut spending at the University of the District of Co-
lumbia). These difficulties could be avoided by an Act of Congress.
173. At a meeting of the new department heads, the Authority distributed a Management
Directive, setting out its expectations for the departments and their heads and requiring them
to "think innovatively about solutions to management issues." See DiSTRICr OF COLUMBIA
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 97-1, at 1 (1997) (providing first official direction to department heads from their new
Authority bosses); see also DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANcIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, ORDER OF AUGUST 5, 1997, at 3 (designating all forthcoming Manage-
ment Directives as having the force of an Authority Order).
A Management Charge to Agency Directors was also distributed at this meeting. Unlike the
Management Directive, it lacked the force of an Order of the Authority, but was clearly in-
tended to be taken seriously by the department heads:
The Authority expects results-not plans; performance-not platitudes. Those indi-
viduals accepting this management charge are committing themselves to a reforma-
tion in government that the District previously has not experienced. Managers unwill-
ing to accept this challenge-those who believe this is another case of business as
usual or who doubt the Authority's seriousness of purpose-should find other em-
ployment.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY,
MANAGEMENT CHARGE TO AGENcy DIRECTORS 1 (distributed Aug. 6, 1997) (on file with The
American University Law Review).
174. See DISTRIT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE
AUTHORITY, RECRUITMENT BULLETIN FOR POSITION OF CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER (Oct. 31,
1997). The qualifications and job description for the CMO position are remarkably similar to
that of a City Manager. Substituting "Authority" for "Mayor" or "City Council," the following
excerpts from the Recruitment Bulletin could be used by any city seeking a City Manager:
"Executes the management policies established by the Authority." Id. at 1. "Supervises the
management reforms and functioning of the nine Departments in a manner that ensures the
delivery of high quality services to the public." Id. "Provides direction, guidance, and oversight
to all strategic planning activities .... " Id.
The recruitment of an individual with the skills described in the Recruitment Bulletin dem-
onstrates the Authority's recognition that its new responsibilities exceed the expertise of its
members and staff; by requiring the Authority to take over the bulk of the District government,
Congress effectively converted a financial control board into a fully empowered municipal gov-
ernment.
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between Authority Board members, and was certainly the capstone to
the District's new governing structure.
In contrast to its effect on the Authority, the D.C. Revitalization Act
dramatically reduced the power and influence of the Mayor and
Council. As the District's new Chief Executive, the Authority must
approve all mayoral actions related to the nine affected departments,
converting the office of Mayor into a largely figurehead positionY 5
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Superpowers amendment and the D.C. Revitalization Act
transformed what was a "financial control board"'" into a fully-
empowered city government.17 Few municipal functions of any sig-
nificance are outside the Authority's control, and arguably none are
beyond its influence.78
The following recommendations acknowledge this arrangement as
an exercise of Congress' constitutionally-derived plenary power over
the District of Columbia.Y9 No opinion is given as to appropriate-
ness; the suggestions are recommended as actions that may be im-
plemented within the current political environment to hasten the
District's recovery from its financial and management crises.
On December 22, 1997, the Authority named Camille Cates Barnette as Chief Management
Officer. While the appointment of a CMO was a prudent, if not necessary, measure taken in
response to the enormous responsibility placed on the Authority's shoulders, it is not expressly
provided for in the D.C. Revitalization Act.
175. SeeD.C. Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 11104(b)(3), 111 Stat. 251, 732 (1997)
(requiring department heads to report to Authority); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILI1TYAND MANAGEMENTASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, ORDER OFAUGUST 5, 1997, at 2 ("All
Mayor's orders and administrative issuances... must be approved by the Authority prior to
issuance."). In addition, as mentioned above, the role of the Council in approving department
head nominations was initially eliminated, then partially restored by the 1998 District of Co-
lumbia Appropriations Act. See supra note 167 (describing partially-restored role in appoint-
ment process); D.C. Revitalization Act § 11105(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring originally that the
Council be notified of Mayor's nominations for appointment).
176. See Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises and Financial Control Boards, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 733, 734 (1997) (defining "financial control board" as "any state-created agency estab-
lished by statute to oversee the financial affairs of a city during a fiscal crisis") [hereinafter
Missed Opportunity]; see also supra note 101 (explaining that original DCFRA envisioned a coop-
erative effort between the Authority and the District's elected officials to resolve financial and
management crises).
177. Although 207(d) (1) allowed the Authority to "stand in the shoes" of the Mayor and
department heads, the Revitalization Act forced the Authority to take action that transformed
its members into the "Chief Executive Officers" of the District of Columbia. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-242 (1981) (designating Mayor as Chief Executive Officer of the District).
178. See D.C. Revitalization Act § 11102(b) (listing departments now under the Authority's
management).
179. SeeU.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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A. Congress
1. Congessional support for Authority actions
As the governing body ultimately responsible for the District's suc-
cess or failure, Congress is obligated to provide the Authority with
not only the statutory tools to fulfill its mandate, but public support
and encouragement for its actions. Public criticism of the Authority
by its overseers in Congress"'0 merely encourages further intransi-
gence from the City's elected politicians and weakens what legitimacy
the Authority possesses. Congressional concerns over Authority ac-
tion (or inaction) can be effectively communicated in the absence of
television cameras and newspaper reporters.
2. Expansion of Authority's ordering power
Congress should amend the Superpowers amendment to allow the
Authority to "stand in the shoes" of not only the mayor, but also of
the Council.'8' Currently, the Authority is able to force legislation by
issuing a recommendation which, if not enacted, can become law af-
ter the Authority consults Congress. 82 Congress recognized the inef-
ficiency of this system when it passed the Superpowers amendment,
but failed to fully correct the problem. 83
180. See supra note 170 (citing examples of congressional criticism of Authority).
181. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating that the Authority's mandate covers
entire District government); see also DCFRA, Pub. L. No. 104-8, § 2(a) (5), 109 Stat. 97, 98
(1995) (stating that "[a] comprehensive approach to fiscal, management, and structural prob-
lems must be undertaken which exempts no part of the District government and which pre-
serves home rule for the citizens of the District of Columbia"). The statutory powers provided
to the Authority should reflect its status as an agent of Congress. As Congress' agent, the
Authority should possess the full ordering power possessed by its creator, the power to issue
orders to any District government entity and to reconstitute the governmental structure in such
a way as would best allow Congress' goals of a fiscal and management recovery in the District to
be achieved. This would loose the shackles on the Authority, allowing it to pursue its broad
mandate.
182. See supra Part III.B (discussing recommending power of the Authority).
183. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 5203 (1996), amending DCFRA, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat.
97 (1995). The amended text of the 207(d) (1) amendment would strike language as follows:
(d) Additional Power to Issue Orders, Rules and Regulations.-
(1) In general.-In addition to the authority described in subsection (c), the Author-
ity may at any time issue such orders, rules, or regulations as it considers appropriate
to carry out the purposes of this Act and the amendments made by this Act. tete-e-
tent that the i...... e" .. t ....f, . .... . -'e,- ...g-iaa is within the a "th.rity of
the Mayer r the head ef afy deparmn er atee f the Distriet geyernment, tt
.... by the Mayer, r h head ofaz, zhd ,te a r..m......aget..
See id.
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3. Repeal of DCFRA Sunset Clause
Congress should abolish the Sunset Clause in the DCFRA.Is Un-
der the current arrangement, D.C. politicians can expect to regain
control of the District government after four years of balanced budg-
ets and favorable access to bond markets.' Thus, the conditions
triggering the end of a control period are independent of whether
true management reform has occurred. The current Sunset Clause
provisions resemble those of control boards in other cities, 86 and do
not take into account the Superpowers amendment and the D.C. Re-
vitalization Act: The Authority is no longer a traditional control
board. Although the its mission has not changed, Congress' ap-
proach, and by extension the Authority's, is very different from what
was envisioned in 1995 when the DCFRA was passed. The criteria for
ending a control period must be adjusted in recognition of the new
role the Authority has been given.
Specifically, the existence of a control period should be linked to
the implementation of the management reform plans'87 developed by
private consultants as required under the D.C. Revitalization Act.1s A
control period should end when, in addition to the current require-
ments, each of the nine district government agencies reach the estab-
lished performance objectives outlined in the management reform
plans."'
B. The President
The President should establish a commission to study potential so-
lutions to the democracy problem in the District of Columbia.' ° This
184. SeeDCFRA§ 107.
185. Although the City submitted a balanced budget for 1998, this progress cannot be at-
tributed to efforts by Washington's elected leaders; the 1998 balanced budget, with the neces-
sary spending cuts, was submitted to Congress by the Authority.
186. See H.R. REP. No. 104-96, at 24-25 (1995) (describing sunset clause provisions of other
financial control boards in other cities).
187. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (explaining how consultants submit reform
plans for the District). The Authority should require the private consultants to identify an ac-
ceptable standard of service that can serve as a performance objective.
188. See D.C. Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 11103(a), 111 Stat. 251, 731-32
(1997).
189. Under the current system, incentive is placed only on achieving a balanced budget,
which leads to cutting expenditures and services rather than reforming the broken manage-
ment system. See Missed Opportunity, supra note 176, at 740 (arguing that control boards may
bring quick solutions but fail to explore the origins of problems). The proposed changes pro-
vide the Mayor with incentive to institute and maintain an efficient city management system
recommended by outside, private consultants.
190. Aside from the salient fact that District residents cannot participate in a significant
portion of the democratic process, the Authority is the most visible assailant in the attack which
Home Rule and Statehood activists feel is being perpetrated against the citizens of Washington.
Thus, the Authority often bears the brunt of their attacks, both in the press and in the form
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will at least provide a forum for District residents and activist groups
to formally propose and debate Constitutional alternatives to Con-
gress' "exclusive legislative authority" over the District.91 As the only
federal official for whom District residents may vote,'92 the President
possesses at least some minimal degree of accountability to District
residents. 93
C. The Authority
1. Increase management expertise
The D.C. Revitalization Act removed from the Authority the luxury
of being selective on the timing, nature, and targets of its manage-
ment reform actions;94 the Act forced the immediate takeover of the
bulk of the D.C. government. Without the constraints of political
ambition or the accountability inherent in a democracy, 95 the
Authority should, in theory, be able to introduce any and all of the
necessary reforms required for a full recovery.
As the District's new Chief Executive, however, the Authority is no
longer in the comfortable position of analyzing departmental behav-
ior from the outside, recommending changes, or issuing orders when
necessary. Under the D.C. Revitalization Act, the Authority must run
the government and is directly accountable for the success of its re-
form efforts. 196 With this increase in the Authority's direct manage-
of protests and other disruptions. The creation of a Presidential commission designed to find a
solution to this problem may diffuse, or at least divert, some of this energy away from the
Authority and allow it to act relatively unencumbered.
191. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
192. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIII.
193. Indeed, the President has shown a willingness to negotiate on behalf of District resi-
dents for changes in the D.C. Revitalization Act. See David A. Vise, Teams of Consultants to Begin
Overhaul of D.C. Government, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1997, at B3 (citing Clinton budget director
Raines' willingness to negotiate for return of Council's role in confirming department head
nominations).
Congress could not credibly undertake this task. As the government body which would stand
to lose plenary legislative authority over more than 500,000 non-voting citizens, an enormous
conflict of interest exists in having Congress appoint and supervise a commission tasked with
providing a democratic alternative for the District of Columbia. Indeed, Congress has used the
District unabashedly for its own private experiments with new social programs and passed laws
benefiting individual constituencies. See D.C. Revitalization Act § 11201 (closing Lorton Cor-
rectional Complex and returning valuable land to Virginia); David A. Vise, House Votes Vouchers
forD.C. Students, WASH. PosT, Oct. 7, 1997, at Al (describing Congress' push to institute school
voucher program in District of Columbia).
194. See D.C. Revitalization Act §§ 11101-11104 (placing timetable on implementation of
components of D.C. Revitalization Plan); supra note 162 (identifying nine departments subject
to Authority control); supra note 163 (describing required action under D.C. Revitalization Act
with regard to nine departments).
195. See Missed Opportunity, supra note 176, at 737 (discussing how the performance of con-
trol boards can be affected by their non-elective status).
196. Prior to the D.C. Revitalization Act, the Mayor could be blamed for interfering with
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ment responsibilities, the Authority must augment the management
expertise of its staff, 97 beyond the hiring of a "Chief Management Of-
ficer." The Authority should hire additional, equally qualified per-
sonnel, and place them inside each of the nine departments. With
these individuals in place, the CMO will be able to receive informa-
tion directly from a qualified individual employed by the Authority.98
2. Improve public relations
Although the Authority may make significant progress utilizing its
statutory powers alone, public understanding and support for the
Authority's efforts would create a more conducive atmosphere for
change. Currently, the Authority operates within a veil of secrecy,
rarely providing insight into the decision making process of the
Board members, and making little effort to respond to attacks in the
press.19
The Authority should hire a public relations specialist, tasked with
not only fielding questions from the press, but also with the promo-
tion of the Authority's reform efforts in the community. Adopting
such a policy serves two purposes. First, it creates increased commu-
nity awareness of the Authority's reform efforts, which may increase
pressure on Washington's elected officials to work cooperatively.
Second, a public relations effort may assist in marginalizing the more
acerbic elements of the Home Rule/D.C. Statehood.
CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia is constitutionally subject to Congress'
plenary legislative authority. Congress is therefore responsible for
the success or failure of the municipal structure created to govern
the District. Recognizing the failure of Washington's Home Rule re-
Authority initiatives, because at the time he had the power to do so.
197. The D.C. Revitalization Act directs the Authority to contract with private consultants to
develop "management reform plans" for each of the nine affected departments of government.
See D.C. Revitalization Act § 11103 (a). Although these provisions recognize the Authority's lim-
ited capacity to perform the type of review and analysis necessary to develop a reform plan for
each agency, the Revitalization Act does not provide for an independent means of evaluating
the reform plans submitted by the private consultants. See id. The effect is "government by pri-
vate consultant." The Authority receives recommendations by the private consultants, and be-
cause of its small, highly specialized staff, is unable to evaluate the details and efficacy of each
plan, forcing it to rely on consultants for reports on the progress being made inside each de-
partment.
198. This structure will decrease the Authority's reliance on private consultants and ensure
qualified appraisals of the District's progress toward implementing the management reform
plans and achieving the recommended performance objectives.
199. Working sessions of the Authority are private. Adoption of new Authority Orders or
other official actions are made in public, but rarely offer insight into the processes that went
into their production.
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gime to provide the most basic city services to its residents, Congress
created a control board to impose change.
The Authority can no longer be properly termed a "Financial Con-
trol Board." Amendments to its enabling act have transformed the
Authority into a fully-empowered, unelected city government; the
City's elected officials now serve in largely advisory capacities. This
condition need not be permanent. The DCFRA provides a Sunset
Clause which allows for the return of "home rule" in a minimum of
four years, and if amended as suggested, will guarantee the return of
a city with measurably improved city services.
To accomplish this formidable task, the Authority must not shrink
from its duties to impose the necessary reforms and engender the
public awareness and support necessary to maintain momentum
once the control period ends. Congress must also recognize the
enormity of the Authority's task by amending the Superpowers
amendment to provide for an ordering power coextensive with Con-
gress' own authority, and a Sunset Clause that reflects the Authority's
new mandate. With these changes in place and the necessary reform
efforts underway, Washington will be poised to become a truly Capi-
tal City.
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